feat(k1): add device-bound shadow control gate
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# ADR 0012: device-bound K1 command authority
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- Status: accepted
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- Date: 2026-07-18
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- Extends: ADR 0004, ADR 0005, ADR 0009 and ADR 0010
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## Context
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Owner-controlled LixelGO traffic proves the K1 modeling START/STOP protobuf
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shape, MQTT topic, QoS and correlated success response for one K1 running the
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exact `xgrids.lixelkity-k1.fw-3.0.2.direct-lan.v1` profile. A bounded offline
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audit also proves that Mission Core's encoder reproduces both retained requests
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byte-for-byte. This is sufficient to describe the current device dialogue, but
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not to replay a captured request or authorize writes to any K1.
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The protocol exposes several identities with different authority. Mission
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Core's provisional device UUID is local inventory identity. The vendor device
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ID is reported by the live K1 and occupies the request header. The K1 serial is
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a separate device-binding value. The OpenAPI value is private command material
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which is absent from live status. LixelGO derives the command session relation
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from the vendor device ID and request type; it is not a reusable caller session.
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Native project durability is also not equivalent to command acceptance. STOP
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success, stream quiescence, return to READY/steady green and a reusable project
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on the scanner are separate observations.
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## Decision
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K1 application control is exact-profile, device-bound and fail-closed.
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1. Mission Core never sends its local inventory UUID, BLE identifier or a K1
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serial in place of the vendor request identity.
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2. Each K1 requires an owner-authorized enrollment containing its vendor device
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ID, serial and private OpenAPI value. Enrollment secrets are not committed,
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placed in Ops, returned by APIs or written to logs.
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3. Before a command can be considered, live MQTT status must attest the same
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vendor device ID and serial under the exact firmware/topology profile.
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Replay evidence cannot establish current command authority.
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4. Identity drift, missing identity, malformed status, profile mismatch or an
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unexpected lifecycle state blocks command planning.
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5. START retains the observed LixelGO parameters: record-and-calculate mode 2,
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LCC scan mode 1, handheld mount mode 0 and the operator's validated project
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name. STOP contains only the same bound header and action.
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6. MQTT command semantics remain QoS 2, retain false. Automatic retry is
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forbidden: an unknown outcome must be reconciled from live status and
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physical evidence before another command.
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7. No firmware, activation, account, update or vendor-cloud endpoint is part of
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the control path. Local direct-LAN MQTT is the only reviewed transport.
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8. STOP completion has four gates: correlated command result, local stream
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quiescence and evidence sealing, READY/steady-green device state, then native
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project verification. Earlier gates must not claim the later ones.
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## Current implementation boundary
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`LiveModelingControlSafety` observes only live device-status messages. It binds
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vendor identity and serial, tracks lifecycle state and creates non-executable
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shadow START/STOP plans. Public state and plan output contain only booleans,
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counts, action, topic, QoS, retain flag, payload length and digest. The encoded
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payload and enrolled values remain private in memory.
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The shadow plan is blocked by both `vendor-writes-disabled` and
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`publisher-not-installed`. There is no MQTT publisher, enrollment endpoint or
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automatic retry path. The physical K1 control remains the production fallback.
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## Promotion gate
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A future publisher requires a separate review and an operator-present physical
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acceptance on the enrolled K1:
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1. confirm exact firmware/profile, steady-green state, battery and storage;
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2. close LixelGO and arm raw evidence plus the intended camera receiver;
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3. attest live READY identity against the device enrollment;
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4. review the shadow command metadata;
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5. send one START, without retry, and correlate its exact response;
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6. observe calibration and first point/pose/camera data;
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7. send one STOP, without retry, and correlate its exact response;
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8. seal local evidence while accepting the bounded stream tail;
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9. wait for READY and steady green before power-off or another scan;
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10. verify the native project independently through the vendor-supported
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workflow.
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Any unknown response, identity change, activation state, fault, low battery or
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unexpected lifecycle transition pauses the test. It does not trigger a guessed
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recovery command.
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## Consequences
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Adding another K1 means creating another private enrollment and proving its
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exact compatibility profile; it never means reusing captured bytes from the
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first scanner. The design preserves native record-and-calculate behavior while
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keeping command authority inside the XGRIDS plugin and out of generic Mission
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Core. It intentionally postpones convenience automation until identity,
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credential provenance, one-shot transport behavior and durable save semantics
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have all passed physical acceptance.
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