feat(k1): recover exact application bootstrap

docs/01_IMPLEMENTATION_PLAN.md

@@ -21,23 +21,25 @@ Each gate produces evidence and an explicit GO, PAUSE or BLOCKED result.
 | Stage 7 observation archive | GO (point/pose/telemetry contract) — durable catalog, recovery, capture-clock-bounded RRD preparation, archived metric time series, saved-session timeline and atomic playback are implemented |
 | Stage 7 recorded cameras | GO (contract), acceptance pending — acquisition-owned fMP4 archive and player are implemented/tested; one real archived K1 camera plus point-cloud session has not passed playback yet |
 | Plugin isolation | GO (laboratory control plane) — vendor backend/frontend and optional scene controls are plugin-owned; manifest/runtime descriptor parity, versioned handshake, lifecycle health and transport correlation fail closed while execution remains in-process |
-| K1 application control | PAUSE (shadow gate implemented) — the exact captured codec is byte-matched, live status binds vendor identity plus serial, and START/STOP can be planned without publish authority; device-bound OpenAPI enrollment, one-shot publisher, physical save acceptance and recovery policy remain closed gates |
+| K1 application control | PAUSE (exact shadow dialogue implemented) — all 10 retained pre-START requests and START/STOP are byte-matched; BLE-selected live DeviceInfo supplies per-scanner identity while one private application-level OpenAPI authority remains outside Git/Ops; publisher, physical save acceptance and recovery policy remain closed gates |
 | Stage 8 product storage | PAUSE — retention, replication, encryption, capacity monitoring and long-run browser/WASM stress remain deployment gates |
 
 USB project copying remains optional ground truth rather than a blocker for the
 now-verified network path. Owner-operated LixelGO traffic verifies the MQTT
 start/stop mapping and RTSP camera transport. The exact start/stop protobuf
 encoder, response correlator and device-status state machine now exist without a
-publisher. Header construction is known: an explicit ASCII device ID and ASCII
-OpenAPI key are required, while the session ID is derived exactly as
-`${device_id}:ModelingRequest`. MQTT control publishing remains deliberately
-disabled. A live-only shadow safety layer now observes the device-reported
-vendor identity and serial, rejects identity drift or malformed status, and can
-form a non-executable START only from unbound `READY` or STOP only from a bound
-`SCANNING` state. Its output contains a digest and wire metadata, never the
-device identity, serial, OpenAPI value or payload. Legitimate per-device OpenAPI
-provisioning, an authorized one-shot publisher and a durable post-stop save gate
-are not proven. The physical button remains the known-safe fallback.
+publisher. Retained PCAP plus client static analysis prove that OpenAPI is one
+private application-level value in this LixelGO build, not a per-scanner
+credential. The selected BLE peripheral returns its own LAN IP; the initial
+unbound `DeviceInfoRequest` then returns vendor ID, serial, model, activation and
+version facts for that live K1. Mission Core's shadow bootstrap reproduces the
+10 observed pre-START requests byte-for-byte: three unbound discovery reads,
+one response-bound time/timezone sync and six further reads. A live-only safety
+layer rejects identity drift or malformed status, and can form a non-executable
+START only from unbound `READY` or STOP only from bound `SCANNING`. Public output
+contains only digests and wire metadata. Secure application-authority loading,
+an authorized response-gated one-shot publisher and durable post-stop save are
+not yet proven. The physical button remains the known-safe fallback.
 
 The Stage 6 live path uses a bounded raw-first bridge: loss in the visualization
 queue cannot discard MQTT evidence. The queue holds four preview messages;
@@ -256,7 +258,7 @@ useful stream is decoded or structurally identified.
 - firmware or internal-Linux analysis;
 - physical end-to-end shared-timeline playback for a newly archived session
   containing point cloud plus one selected K1 camera;
-- legitimate K1 OpenAPI credential provisioning, authorized command transport
+- private application-level OpenAPI authority loading, authorized command transport
   and stable-artifact proof after the observed stop lifecycle;
 - long-running large-session WebViewer/WASM memory telemetry;
 - production retention, replication, encryption and cross-platform packaging.