feat(k1): recover exact application bootstrap

This commit is contained in:
DCCONSTRUCTIONS
2026-07-18 13:54:25 +03:00
parent af9319a33b
commit d7749208a7
15 changed files with 906 additions and 215 deletions
@@ -112,9 +112,9 @@ plugin-owned.
The operator project name is normalized and validated by the K1 contribution,
stored as display/catalog metadata and never used as a path component. This ADR
does not claim that it reaches the scanner: the inert modeling-control codec has
no publisher, and automatic K1 writes remain disabled pending legitimate OpenAPI
credential provisioning and durable post-stop save evidence.
does not claim that it reaches the scanner: the inert application-control codec
has no publisher, and automatic K1 writes remain disabled pending reviewed
private application-authority loading and durable post-stop save evidence.
ADR 0011 subsequently places the action control plane behind a versioned
descriptor/handshake/health transport seam. Observation discovery and export
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
# ADR 0012: device-bound K1 command authority
# ADR 0012: live-bound K1 control with application-level authority
- Status: accepted
- Date: 2026-07-18
@@ -6,89 +6,113 @@
## Context
Owner-controlled LixelGO traffic proves the K1 modeling START/STOP protobuf
shape, MQTT topic, QoS and correlated success response for one K1 running the
exact `xgrids.lixelkity-k1.fw-3.0.2.direct-lan.v1` profile. A bounded offline
audit also proves that Mission Core's encoder reproduces both retained requests
byte-for-byte. This is sufficient to describe the current device dialogue, but
not to replay a captured request or authorize writes to any K1.
Owner-controlled LixelGO traffic proves the K1 preparation and modeling
dialogue for one activated K1 running the exact
`xgrids.lixelkity-k1.fw-3.0.2.direct-lan.v1` profile. Offline regression proves
that Mission Core reproduces all ten requests before START, plus START and STOP,
byte-for-byte. This describes the current device dialogue but does not authorize
writes to any K1.
The protocol exposes several identities with different authority. Mission
Core's provisional device UUID is local inventory identity. The vendor device
ID is reported by the live K1 and occupies the request header. The K1 serial is
a separate device-binding value. The OpenAPI value is private command material
which is absent from live status. LixelGO derives the command session relation
from the vendor device ID and request type; it is not a reusable caller session.
The protocol exposes identities with different ownership. Mission Core's
inventory UUID and the macOS CoreBluetooth UUID are local transport identities.
The vendor device ID and serial identify the live scanner. The OpenAPI value is
private application material: retained traffic uses one value across every
request type, and decompiled LixelGO uses its embedded application value before
the serial-derived fallback. It is therefore not a manual per-scanner profile.
Native project durability is also not equivalent to command acceptance. STOP
success, stream quiescence, return to READY/steady green and a reusable project
on the scanner are separate observations.
The selected BLE peripheral returns the LAN address of that same unit during
the reviewed Wi-Fi provisioning exchange. On MQTT, LixelGO first sends
`DeviceInfoRequest` without a device ID. `DeviceInfoResponse` supplies vendor ID,
serial, model, activation and version facts; subsequent headers bind to that
identity. Native project durability remains separate from command acceptance.
## Decision
K1 application control is exact-profile, device-bound and fail-closed.
K1 application control is exact-profile, live-bound and fail-closed.
1. Mission Core never sends its local inventory UUID, BLE identifier or a K1
serial in place of the vendor request identity.
2. Each K1 requires an owner-authorized enrollment containing its vendor device
ID, serial and private OpenAPI value. Enrollment secrets are not committed,
placed in Ops, returned by APIs or written to logs.
3. Before a command can be considered, live MQTT status must attest the same
vendor device ID and serial under the exact firmware/topology profile.
Replay evidence cannot establish current command authority.
4. Identity drift, missing identity, malformed status, profile mismatch or an
unexpected lifecycle state blocks command planning.
5. START retains the observed LixelGO parameters: record-and-calculate mode 2,
LCC scan mode 1, handheld mount mode 0 and the operator's validated project
name. STOP contains only the same bound header and action.
6. MQTT command semantics remain QoS 2, retain false. Automatic retry is
forbidden: an unknown outcome must be reconciled from live status and
physical evidence before another command.
7. No firmware, activation, account, update or vendor-cloud endpoint is part of
the control path. Local direct-LAN MQTT is the only reviewed transport.
8. STOP completion has four gates: correlated command result, local stream
quiescence and evidence sealing, READY/steady-green device state, then native
project verification. Earlier gates must not claim the later ones.
1. Mission Core never substitutes its inventory UUID, BLE UUID or serial for
the vendor request identity.
2. One private application-level OpenAPI authority is loaded outside Git, Ops,
browser state, APIs and logs. It is not copied into scanner profiles.
3. The BLE-selected transport is followed by an unbound DeviceInfo exchange.
Its live vendor ID, serial, activation and FW 3.0.2 facts form the transient
device binding; a saved profile is optional metadata, not protocol authority.
4. The ten retained pre-START requests keep their exact order and response
boundaries. The only mutation is the observed time/timezone sync; the other
nine requests are reads. No request is batched, skipped or automatically
retried.
5. Live DeviceInfo binding must agree with the live DeviceStatus stream before
START/STOP planning. Identity drift, malformed data, inactive equipment,
profile mismatch or an unexpected lifecycle state fails closed.
6. START retains record-and-calculate mode 2, LCC mode 1, handheld mount 0 and
the validated project name. STOP contains only bound header and action.
7. MQTT application semantics remain QoS 2, retain false. An unknown outcome is
reconciled from correlated response, status and physical evidence before any
new operator-authorized attempt.
8. No firmware, activation, account, update or vendor-cloud mutation belongs to
this path. `GetCloudServerConfig` is a local K1 read.
9. STOP completion has separate gates: correlated result, local stream
quiescence/evidence sealing, READY plus steady green, then independent native
project verification.
## Recovered pre-START sequence
The clean cycle contains:
1. unbound `DeviceInfoRequest`;
2. unbound `ModelingStatusRequest`;
3. unbound `GetRtkAdvanceRequest`;
4. bound `DeviceConfigRequest` time/timezone sync;
5. bound `DeviceInfoRequest`;
6. bound `GetRtkAdvanceRequest`;
7. bound `GetNtripProfileRequest`;
8. bound `GetCloudServerConfigRequest`;
9. bound `GetRtkAdvanceRequest`;
10. bound `DeviceInfoRequest`;
11. bound `ModelingRequest` START.
Normal sessions are `${device_id_or_empty}:${MessageType}`. Time sync uses the
captured special relation
`${device_id}:DeviceConfigRequest:Publish_Proto_DeviceConfig_SetTime`.
## Current implementation boundary
`LiveModelingControlSafety` observes only live device-status messages. It binds
vendor identity and serial, tracks lifecycle state and creates non-executable
shadow START/STOP plans. Public state and plan output contain only booleans,
counts, action, topic, QoS, retain flag, payload length and digest. The encoded
payload and enrolled values remain private in memory.
`application_bootstrap.py` provides the bounded application authority type,
DeviceInfo response correlation/decoding and the exact non-executable ten-step
shadow plan. Its retained clean-cycle regression is 10/10 payloads and topic
order. `LiveModelingControlSafety` independently binds that DeviceInfo identity
to live status and creates non-executable START/STOP plans.
The shadow plan is blocked by both `vendor-writes-disabled` and
`publisher-not-installed`. There is no MQTT publisher, enrollment endpoint or
automatic retry path. The physical K1 control remains the production fallback.
Public state contains only booleans, counts and wire metadata. Private identity,
authority and payload bytes stay out of repr/API output. Both shadow paths are
blocked by `vendor-writes-disabled` and `publisher-not-installed`; no MQTT
publisher or automatic retry path exists.
## Promotion gate
A future publisher requires a separate review and an operator-present physical
acceptance on the enrolled K1:
A future publisher requires separate review and an operator-present physical
acceptance:
1. confirm exact firmware/profile, steady-green state, battery and storage;
2. close LixelGO and arm raw evidence plus the intended camera receiver;
3. attest live READY identity against the device enrollment;
4. review the shadow command metadata;
5. send one START, without retry, and correlate its exact response;
1. load the private application authority through a reviewed local secret
mechanism;
2. confirm battery/storage and select one K1 over BLE;
3. run the exact response-gated bootstrap and attest activated FW 3.0.2;
4. confirm READY identity against DeviceInfo and review shadow metadata;
5. send one START without retry and correlate its response;
6. observe calibration and first point/pose/camera data;
7. send one STOP, without retry, and correlate its exact response;
7. send one STOP without retry and correlate its response;
8. seal local evidence while accepting the bounded stream tail;
9. wait for READY and steady green before power-off or another scan;
10. verify the native project independently through the vendor-supported
workflow.
9. wait for READY and steady green;
10. verify the native project through the vendor-supported workflow.
Any unknown response, identity change, activation state, fault, low battery or
unexpected lifecycle transition pauses the test. It does not trigger a guessed
recovery command.
Any unknown response, identity change, fault, low battery/storage or unexpected
transition pauses the test. It never triggers a guessed recovery command.
## Consequences
Adding another K1 means creating another private enrollment and proving its
exact compatibility profile; it never means reusing captured bytes from the
first scanner. The design preserves native record-and-calculate behavior while
keeping command authority inside the XGRIDS plugin and out of generic Mission
Core. It intentionally postpones convenience automation until identity,
credential provenance, one-shot transport behavior and durable save semantics
have all passed physical acceptance.
Adding another identical K1 means selecting it over BLE and deriving a fresh
live DeviceInfo binding, not creating or copying a command profile. A second
physical K1 remains a useful portability acceptance, but another packet capture
is not required before implementing the reviewed current profile. The design
preserves native record-and-calculate behavior while keeping vendor control in
the XGRIDS plugin and out of generic Mission Core.