feat(k1): add offline control execution gate

docs/01_IMPLEMENTATION_PLAN.md

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ Each gate produces evidence and an explicit GO, PAUSE or BLOCKED result.
 | Stage 7 observation archive | GO (point/pose/telemetry contract) — durable catalog, recovery, capture-clock-bounded RRD preparation, archived metric time series, saved-session timeline and atomic playback are implemented |
 | Stage 7 recorded cameras | GO (contract), acceptance pending — acquisition-owned fMP4 archive and player are implemented/tested; one real archived K1 camera plus point-cloud session has not passed playback yet |
 | Plugin isolation | GO (laboratory control plane) — vendor backend/frontend and optional scene controls are plugin-owned; manifest/runtime descriptor parity, versioned handshake, lifecycle health and transport correlation fail closed while execution remains in-process |
-| K1 application control | PAUSE (exact shadow dialogue implemented) — all 10 retained pre-START requests and START/STOP are byte-matched; BLE-selected live DeviceInfo supplies per-scanner identity while one private application-level OpenAPI authority remains outside Git/Ops; publisher, physical save acceptance and recovery policy remain closed gates |
+| K1 application control | PAUSE (offline execution gate complete) — exact five-batch response-barrier orchestrator passes the retained 10-request dialogue; the 36-byte application authority loads only from macOS Keychain; current publisher boundary is structurally write-disabled and never touches its sink; runtime wiring, physical START/STOP and durable save remain closed gates |
 | Stage 8 product storage | PAUSE — retention, replication, encryption, capacity monitoring and long-run browser/WASM stress remain deployment gates |
 
 USB project copying remains optional ground truth rather than a blocker for the
@@ -33,13 +33,17 @@ private application-level value in this LixelGO build, not a per-scanner
 credential. The selected BLE peripheral returns its own LAN IP; the initial
 unbound `DeviceInfoRequest` then returns vendor ID, serial, model, activation and
 version facts for that live K1. Mission Core's shadow bootstrap reproduces the
-10 observed pre-START requests byte-for-byte: three unbound discovery reads,
-one response-bound time/timezone sync and six further reads. A live-only safety
-layer rejects identity drift or malformed status, and can form a non-executable
-START only from unbound `READY` or STOP only from bound `SCANNING`. Public output
-contains only digests and wire metadata. Secure application-authority loading,
-an authorized response-gated one-shot publisher and durable post-stop save are
-not yet proven. The physical button remains the known-safe fallback.
+10 observed pre-START requests byte-for-byte across five recovered batches:
+initial DeviceInfo binding; ModelingStatus plus RTK read; time sync plus
+DeviceInfo/RTK; NTRIP read; then cloud/RTK/DeviceInfo reads. The first
+ModelingStatus request has no mandatory synchronous response barrier; readiness
+is separately attested through live DeviceStatus. A fixed macOS Keychain loader
+now reads the exact 36-byte authority without environment/file/browser fallback.
+The response orchestrator correlates required headers/results and rejects
+identity/profile drift. The installed publish boundary is a separate
+write-disabled type that cannot call its injected sink. Runtime wiring, a
+reviewed write-capable type and durable post-stop save remain unproven. The
+physical button remains the known-safe fallback.
 
 The Stage 6 live path uses a bounded raw-first bridge: loss in the visualization
 queue cannot discard MQTT evidence. The queue holds four preview messages;
@@ -258,7 +262,7 @@ useful stream is decoded or structurally identified.
 - firmware or internal-Linux analysis;
 - physical end-to-end shared-timeline playback for a newly archived session
   containing point cloud plus one selected K1 camera;
-- private application-level OpenAPI authority loading, authorized command transport
+- operator-owned Keychain provisioning/execution lease, authorized command transport
   and stable-artifact proof after the observed stop lifecycle;
 - long-running large-session WebViewer/WASM memory telemetry;
 - production retention, replication, encryption and cross-platform packaging.