NODEDC_MISSION_CORE/README.md

# NODEDC MISSION CORE

NODEDC MISSION CORE is the vendor-neutral control, observation, mission-planning,
recording, and integration platform for NODEDC autonomous systems. This
repository is the canonical early-stage monorepo: it contains the Mission Core
Control Station, the current local control plane, shared contracts as they are
extracted, and device plugins.

The first proven hardware vertical is the XGRIDS/LixelKity K1 plugin. On firmware
3.0.2 the host provisions the scanner onto an existing LAN without LixelGO,
connects to its MQTT broker, persists each raw frame before preview work, decodes
point cloud and pose, and renders the real cloud plus trajectory through an
embedded self-hosted Rerun Web Viewer. Capture files are `fsync`ed on clean
close; per-frame power-loss durability is not claimed. The former Foxglove
bridge remains only as a legacy regression module.

The repository is intentionally migrating in stages. The current `src/k1link`
package is the compatibility implementation of the first plugin path; vendor
transport and codecs will move behind `plugins/xgrids-k1` and the Mission Core
Plugin SDK without changing the verified wire protocol or raw evidence format.

Plugin SDK v0alpha2 now provides executable, vendor-neutral identity, session,
operation, stream, evidence and compatibility contracts. The meanings remain a
local experimental vocabulary rather than a mutation of NODE.DC Platform
Ontology. The current runtime is still transitional and in process: it uses an
explicitly injected K1 normalizer to produce transport-neutral local consumer
views; portable SDK stream envelopes, process isolation, durable operations,
multi-device routing and the remote Edge split remain later gates.

The current runtime cannot read K1 firmware automatically. It keeps the exact
profile inactive until the operator explicitly attests firmware `3.0.2` and
direct-LAN topology; state records that basis as `operator-attested`, not as
device-derived evidence.

The repository now contains one narrowly gated state-changing command:
`ble wifi-configure`. It accepts only the reviewed firmware-3 provisioning
profile and requires explicit `--confirm-write`; the Wi-Fi password is collected
through a hidden local macOS dialog. MQTT capture and decoding are read-only.
Nothing changes router settings, firmware or global Python packages.

## Verified XGRIDS K1 stand

- one XGRIDS/LixelKity K1;
- one Apple Silicon MacBook running macOS;
- one ordinary TP-Link Deco/mesh network used by other devices;
- the proven baseline used no LixelGO, phone, Linux host, dedicated AP,
  OpenWrt, or vendor SDK.

An owner-controlled iPhone with LixelGO is now available for a separate,
evidence-only observation stage. It does not invalidate the no-phone baseline
and is not a runtime dependency. The decision and gated runbook are
[`ADR 0005`](docs/adr/0005-owner-controlled-lixelgo-iphone-observation.md) and
[`docs/08_LIXELGO_IPHONE_OBSERVATION.md`](docs/08_LIXELGO_IPHONE_OBSERVATION.md).
The Mac capture environment is isolated under
`plugins/xgrids-k1/lab/iphone-capture/` and does not require full Xcode.

The ordinary router is sufficient for the first gates. We first observe the
existing LAN without changing it. A Guest/IoT SSID is optional and may be
counterproductive if Deco isolates clients; Mac and K1 must ultimately be able
to reach each other.

## What is actually being proved

The project has three independent gates:

1. K1 is operational and can record a project autonomously.
2. Mac can discover and inspect the K1 BLE/GATT surface safely.
3. Without LixelGO, K1 can be associated with Wi-Fi and a proprietary data
   session can be opened.

All three gates are now proven on the tested unit. The spatial stream is plain
MQTT 3.1.1 on TCP 1883. Firmware-3 `lio_pcl` is protobuf wrapped in a raw LZ4
block, and `lio_pose` is an uncompressed protobuf. Owner-operated LixelGO capture
also proved separate left/right RTSP/H.264 camera previews on TCP 8554. This is a
compressed preview contract, not proof of full-resolution raw camera access.

## Local environment

The project uses Python 3.12 in a repository-local `.venv` managed by `uv`.
This does not install Python packages globally and does not modify neighboring
repositories.

```bash
cd /Users/dcconstructions/Downloads/mnt/NODEDC/NODEDC_MISSION_CORE
uv sync --frozen --group dev
uv run k1link doctor
uv run pytest
```

## Mission Core Control Station and visualization adapters

The browser application is the universal Mission Core Control Station rather than
a K1-specific Foxglove launcher. Its fixed shell contains six architectural
sections — Center, Fleet, Observation, Missions, Data and System — while the K1
BLE/Wi-Fi/live workflow remains isolated as the first real device adapter.

Install, type-check, build and serve the complete local application from the
repository root:

```bash
uv sync --frozen --group dev
cd apps/control-station
npm ci
npm run test:unit
npm run typecheck
npm run build
cd ../..
uv run k1link serve
```

Open `http://127.0.0.1:8000`. The static application, REST/WebSocket control
plane and credential endpoint bind to loopback only. The current K1 adapter
still provides real CoreBluetooth discovery, one operator-triggered reviewed
BLE Wi-Fi provisioning write, read-only MQTT live capture, native `.k1mqtt` and
reviewed-TSV replay, raw-first evidence storage and measured preview metrics.
Physical K1 scanning is still started and stopped by the verified double-click;
the connector publishes no modeling command. The observed LixelGO action mapping
remains descriptive and write-disabled.

This locked bootstrap is repeatable in the current workspace, not yet a
standalone release install. The frontend consumes sibling `file:` packages from
`NODEDC_DESIGN_GUIDELINE`; `package-lock.json` does not pin that checkout's Git
revision or content hash. Publishing/vendoring those packages or enforcing an
immutable donor revision remains a packaging and CI prerequisite.

The Observation spatial workspace embeds the open-source Rerun Web Viewer
inside the Mission Core shell. It can open a compatible RRD file over HTTP(S) or a
Rerun gRPC/proxy source such as `rerun+http://127.0.0.1:9876/proxy`. It does not
use an external hosted viewer UI.

The first K1 live session or replay in a `k1link serve` process creates one local
Rerun `RecordingStream`, starts its gRPC/proxy server on TCP 9876 and publishes
the resulting URL through control-plane state. Later sessions reset their
session-local scene and metrics and reuse that process-wide stream; this avoids
restarting the native listener while the embedded browser remains connected.
Unless an operator has entered a manual source, the React application assigns
that URL to the embedded viewer. The complete runtime path is K1 MQTT → raw-first
evidence capture → bounded latest-wins preview queue → explicitly injected K1
protobuf/LZ4 normalizer → transport-neutral decoded local views → Rerun
`Points3D`, `Transform3D` and `LineStrips3D` → embedded Web Viewer. Rerun does
not inspect K1 topics or raw payloads. These local decoded views are not yet the
portable Plugin SDK wire envelopes.

The default Rerun blueprint shows a 12-second sliding accumulation of real point
frames. Product controls are connected for point size, intensity/height/distance
or available RGB coloring, Turbo/Viridis/Plasma/grayscale/custom palettes,
point and trajectory visibility, and the scene grid. Projection, custom
timeline transport and saved layout remain later product work. No synthetic
point cloud, trajectory, camera frame or latency value is generated.

A powered-device checkpoint passed 80 real MQTT messages through the current
Rerun runtime: 38 point-cloud frames, 42 pose frames, 2,775 points in the last
cloud and zero decode errors. The later RTSP camera preview is not yet wired into
the Rerun/runtime path. Rerun `capture_time` is the Mac receive timestamp, not a
proven K1 sensor timestamp or photon-to-screen measurement.

The old Foxglove implementation is retained only in
`src/k1link/viewer/foxglove_bridge.py` and its regression tests. The current
live/replay runtime does not start it or use TCP 8765. The
[live viewer runbook](docs/06_K1_LIVE_VIEWER.md) records the active Rerun path and
its timing/security boundaries; the frontend contract is documented in
[`apps/control-station/README.md`](apps/control-station/README.md).

The FastAPI application and credential endpoint bind to loopback, but the Rerun
gRPC server currently binds TCP 9876 on all network interfaces even though its
reported source URL contains `127.0.0.1`. It has no connector-level
authentication or TLS. Use it only on a trusted laboratory LAN, do not expose
9876 to the public Internet or a cellular WAN, and add an authenticated secure
proxy before any remote deployment. Stopping acquisition keeps the local scene
server and its URL available for the next session. Stop `k1link serve` to close
the listener and release its retained memory.

`doctor` is intentionally non-invasive. It checks the local Python environment
and reports external tools; it does not request Bluetooth permission, scan the
LAN, touch the K1, alter Homebrew, or change capture permissions.

The implemented laboratory commands include:

```bash
uv run k1link ble scan --duration 30 --out sessions/<id>/captures/ble.json
uv run k1link ble gatt-dump --device <corebluetooth-uuid> \
  --out sessions/<id>/captures/gatt.json
uv run k1link ble wifi-configure --device <corebluetooth-uuid> \
  --profile xgrids-k1-fw3-wifi-v1 --write-mode with_response \
  --confirm-write --out sessions/<id>/captures/wifi.sensitive.json
uv run k1link net snapshot --out sessions/<id>/captures/network.json
uv run k1link net mqtt-capture --host <confirmed-private-k1-ip> \
  --confirm-owned-device --duration 180 \
  --out sessions/<id>/captures/mqtt-run
uv run k1link analyze mqtt-streams \
  --capture sessions/<id>/captures/mqtt-run/mqtt.raw.k1mqtt \
  --out sessions/<id>/analysis/mqtt-streams.summary.json
```

On macOS the BLE scan is active CoreBluetooth discovery, but it does not connect
to or modify devices. `gatt-dump` connects and performs service discovery only.
`mqtt-capture` accepts only a literal RFC1918 target, uses a fixed report-topic
allowlist, never publishes and never reconnects. It writes a length-framed raw
file, JSONL metadata and an integrity summary with mode `0600`.

Session output is sensitive and ignored by Git. It can contain device identity,
trajectory, mapped interiors and local addressing even when no credentials are
present.

## Documentation

- [Technical audit](docs/00_TECHNICAL_AUDIT.md)
- [Implementation gates](docs/01_IMPLEMENTATION_PLAN.md)
- [First lab runbook](docs/02_FIRST_LAB_RUNBOOK.md)
- [Artifact and secret policy](docs/03_ARTIFACT_POLICY.md)
- [Reviewed BLE Wi-Fi profile](docs/04_K1_WIFI_PROVISIONING_PROFILE.md)
- [Verified MQTT stream profile](docs/05_K1_MQTT_STREAM_PROFILE.md)
- [Live console and embedded Rerun runbook](docs/06_K1_LIVE_VIEWER.md)
- [Mission Core monorepo and plugin boundary](docs/07_MISSION_CORE_MONOREPO.md)
- [Monorepo architecture decision](docs/adr/0002-mission-core-monorepo.md)
- [Device plugin UI and runtime boundary](docs/adr/0003-device-plugin-ui-and-runtime-boundary.md)
- [Plugin SDK v0alpha2 and experimental device lifecycle](docs/adr/0004-plugin-sdk-v0alpha2-and-experimental-device-lifecycle.md)
- [Redacted live lab report](docs/lab/001_K1_LIVE_MQTT_20260715.redacted.md)
- [Session manifest schema](schemas/session-manifest.schema.json)
- [Reference input provenance](docs/reference/README.md)

The two supplied source documents are retained unchanged under
`docs/reference/`. Corrections and decisions are recorded separately so their
provenance remains clear.

## Safety boundary

Allowed initial work is non-mutating discovery, standard device-information reads,
controlled notification listening, autonomous button operation, targeted
capture of traffic to or from the confirmed K1 address, and offline analysis of
owned artifacts.

The reviewed provisioning write requires its named profile and explicit operator
confirmation. Application command publishing remains disabled: physical
double-click is the verified start/stop mechanism. Any future MQTT publisher,
router configuration change or new BLE write requires its own evidence and
reviewed step. Random writes, fuzzing, brute force, firmware operations,
destructive file access and credential guessing remain out of scope.

Real captures, projects, router metadata, serials, credentials, maps, images,
and logs are ignored by normal Git. Redacted manifests and SHA-256 inventories
are committed; encrypted artifact storage will be selected only when real data
exists.