NDC XGRIDS K1 Connector

Pre-production research project for connecting an owner-controlled XGRIDS/LixelKity K1 to a Mac without LixelGO, firmware changes, device opening, or speculative writes.

Current status: live proof completed on firmware 3.0.2. The Mac provisioned the K1 onto an existing LAN without LixelGO, connected to its MQTT broker, captured the scan-correlated point-cloud and pose streams, and decoded both successfully.

The repository now contains one narrowly gated state-changing command: ble wifi-configure. It accepts only the reviewed firmware-3 provisioning profile and requires explicit --confirm-write; the Wi-Fi password is collected through a hidden local macOS dialog. MQTT capture and decoding are read-only. Nothing changes router settings, firmware or global Python packages.

Available stand

• one XGRIDS/LixelKity K1;
• one Apple Silicon MacBook running macOS;
• one ordinary TP-Link Deco/mesh network used by other devices;
• no LixelGO, phone, Linux host, dedicated AP, OpenWrt, or vendor SDK.

The ordinary router is sufficient for the first gates. We first observe the existing LAN without changing it. A Guest/IoT SSID is optional and may be counterproductive if Deco isolates clients; Mac and K1 must ultimately be able to reach each other.

What is actually being proved

The project has three independent gates:

1. K1 is operational and can record a project autonomously.
2. Mac can discover and inspect the K1 BLE/GATT surface safely.
3. Without LixelGO, K1 can be associated with Wi-Fi and a proprietary data session can be opened.

All three gates are now proven on the tested unit. The external stream is plain MQTT 3.1.1 on TCP 1883. Firmware-3 lio_pcl is protobuf wrapped in a raw LZ4 block, and lio_pose is an uncompressed protobuf. Raw panoramic camera access is still unproven and is not implied by point-cloud success.

Local environment

The project uses Python 3.12 in a repository-local .venv managed by uv. This does not install Python packages globally and does not modify neighboring repositories.

cd /Users/dcconstructions/Downloads/mnt/NODEDC/NDC_xgrids-k1-connector
uv sync --group dev
uv run k1link doctor
uv run pytest

doctor is intentionally non-invasive. It checks the local Python environment and reports external tools; it does not request Bluetooth permission, scan the LAN, touch the K1, alter Homebrew, or change capture permissions.

The implemented laboratory commands include:

uv run k1link ble scan --duration 30 --out sessions/<id>/captures/ble.json
uv run k1link ble gatt-dump --device <corebluetooth-uuid> \
  --out sessions/<id>/captures/gatt.json
uv run k1link ble wifi-configure --device <corebluetooth-uuid> \
  --profile xgrids-k1-fw3-wifi-v1 --write-mode with_response \
  --confirm-write --out sessions/<id>/captures/wifi.sensitive.json
uv run k1link net snapshot --out sessions/<id>/captures/network.json
uv run k1link net mqtt-capture --host <confirmed-private-k1-ip> \
  --confirm-owned-device --duration 180 \
  --out sessions/<id>/captures/mqtt-run
uv run k1link analyze mqtt-streams \
  --capture sessions/<id>/captures/mqtt-run/mqtt.raw.k1mqtt \
  --out sessions/<id>/analysis/mqtt-streams.summary.json

On macOS the BLE scan is active CoreBluetooth discovery, but it does not connect to or modify devices. gatt-dump connects and performs service discovery only. mqtt-capture accepts only a literal RFC1918 target, uses a fixed report-topic allowlist, never publishes and never reconnects. It writes a length-framed raw file, JSONL metadata and an integrity summary with mode 0600.

Session output is sensitive and ignored by Git. It can contain device identity, trajectory, mapped interiors and local addressing even when no credentials are present.

Documentation

• Technical audit
• Implementation gates
• First lab runbook
• Artifact and secret policy
• Reviewed BLE Wi-Fi profile
• Verified MQTT stream profile
• Redacted live lab report
• Session manifest schema
• Reference input provenance

The two supplied source documents are retained unchanged under docs/reference/. Corrections and decisions are recorded separately so their provenance remains clear.

Safety boundary

Allowed initial work is non-mutating discovery, standard device-information reads, controlled notification listening, autonomous button operation, targeted capture of traffic to or from the confirmed K1 address, and offline analysis of owned artifacts.

The reviewed provisioning write requires its named profile and explicit operator confirmation. Application command publishing remains disabled: physical double-click is the verified start/stop mechanism. Any future MQTT publisher, router configuration change or new BLE write requires its own evidence and reviewed step. Random writes, fuzzing, brute force, firmware operations, destructive file access and credential guessing remain out of scope.

Real captures, projects, router metadata, serials, credentials, maps, images, and logs are ignored by normal Git. Redacted manifests and SHA-256 inventories are committed; encrypted artifact storage will be selected only when real data exists.